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CHAPTER THREE
TIBETAN DIASPORA IN THE SHADOW
OF THE SELF-IMMOLATION CRISIS:
CONSEQUENCES OF COLONIALISM
ROBERT D. SLOANE*

Self-immolation is a reclamation of sovereignty over one’s own self within
a state of siege. Biological life is taken in an assertion of political life. It is
this possibility that is terrifying to the state in its quest to stabilize
territorial sovereignty.
—Emily T. Yeh1

I.
From February 27, 2009, to date (at the time of this writing, July 17,
2013), in at least 120 confirmed cases,2 Tibetans living in areas
incorporated into the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”)3 have set
themselves on fire.4 The media has referred to these tragic acts as selfimmolation. Their pace has increased exponentially in recent years and
months. In November 2012 alone, twenty-eight Tibetans self-immolated.5
Contrary to common belief, self-immolation does not literally mean
suicide by fire, which is more precisely denoted by the word autocremation. Rather, self-immolation literally means “offering of oneself as
a sacrifice,” particularly in the service of an ideal or deeply held belief.6 It
originates in “the Latin ‘molare,’ meaning to make a sacrifice of grain.”7
For Tibet, its etymological origin may be significant. It indicates perhaps
the quintessential reason, so far as it may reliably be ascertained despite
PRC censorship and other barriers to primary research,8 that many
Tibetans have recently decided to set themselves on fire. It is an act of
profound dissent and protest, among other sentiments.9
Self-immolation is a comparatively recent phenomenon among both
Tibetans within Tibet and, to a lesser extent, those residing in exile.10 But
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for many years (since roughly 1959), and to date, Tibetans have expressed
their rejection of Chinese rule in a less drastic way, namely, by fleeing
occupied Tibet. At great personal risk, Tibetans of all ages—from young
school children to the elderly—flee Tibet each year and seek refuge in
India, Nepal, and (rarely) elsewhere, even though they thereby generally
condemn themselves to statelessness, poverty, and permanent separation
from family and friends, among other tragic consequences. For most of the
past two and a half decades, between 2,500 and 3,500 Tibetans have fled
Tibet annually. The exodus of Tibetans persists to this day despite the
natural perils of a journey over the Himalayas and the political, especially
security, perils of apprehension by Chinese police, military forces, and
border patrols, which can lead to torture, detention, and, in extreme cases,
extrajudicial killing. With a native Tibetan population of just 6 million,
and in view of the risks involved, these numbers speak volumes. After a
new wave of protests swept across Tibet in 2008, China intensified its
chokehold over the region. It also—diplomatically, economically, and
otherwise—coerced Nepal and India to adopt harsh policies that further
discourage Tibetans from seeking greater freedoms in these states. The
upshot, according to recent estimates, is that the number of Tibetans who
manage to flee China annually has declined dramatically.
After more than fifty years, however, an estimated 150,000 Tibetans
live in exile. In colloquial terms, their situation is one of the most enduring
among the world’s unresolved refugee crises—colloquial because few
Tibetans in exile enjoy any, still less refugee, status under national or
international law, including aid or protection from the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees. Most reside in scattered settlements,
some quite remote, in India and Nepal (approximately 125,000 and
25,000, respectively). Smaller communities exist in the United States,
Canada, Switzerland, and a few other states. Neither India nor Nepal is a
party to the 1951 Refugee Convention or its 1967 Protocol.11 In part as a
consequence, neither state recognizes refugees as such under its law or
affords them comparable legal status. It would therefore be more accurate
to characterize the roughly 150,000 Tibetans in exile as stateless.12
The reason for the Tibetan crisis of statelessness is not complicated: for
the reasons detailed below, their true state of nationality has been under
belligerent occupation for more than sixty years, since the People’s
Liberation Army (“PLA”) invaded Tibet in 1950. One year later, China
purported formally to annex and incorporate it into the PRC. Stateless
Tibetans, in short, lack a state to which to return. Until internal political
changes in China proper make negotiations over, at a minimum, a genuine
autonomous arrangement for the Tibetan people plausible, there can be no
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resolution to the Tibetan refugee, or statelessness, crisis.
The tragic, and tragically neglected,13 wave of self-immolations in
Tibet in the past few years and the longstanding Tibetan refugee crisis
share a common origin in China’s colonization of Tibet. Since Tibet’s
occupation, China has treated the Tibetan people exactly as colonizer
treats colonized.14 Hence both the refugee crisis and the more recent selfimmolation crisis represent sociopolitical and psychological consequences
arising from the same colonial dynamic. By saying this, I mean to cast
doubt on the predominant view, even among largely sympathetic scholars,
activists, and politicians in (mostly Western) liberal democracies: namely,
that Tibet is just another minority region within China and that the human
rights violations suffered by its people, however serious, originate in
China’s generally inequitable treatment of its national minorities.15 The
truth is that, legally, Tibet is a country, a nation-state, under longstanding
belligerent occupation,16 and Tibetans qualify as a people, in every legal
sense of the word, entitled under international law to exercise their right to
self-determination—including the right to choose independence, associated
statehood, or integration with another state.17 The same right has been
afforded to most every other formerly colonized people in the postwar
era.18
Self-immolation is not just one more manifestation of political dissent
in response to the denial of this right to self-determination; increasingly, it
is the only available form of dissent possible in the police state in which
Tibetans live. For an increasing number of Tibetans, it seems, selfimmolation is preferable to a life of colonial exploitation or a worthwhile
sacrifice to express their dissent from and protest of more than half a
century of foreign occupation, human rights violations, and international
neglect. Without appreciating the colonial status and colonization of Tibet
and its people, respectively, the phenomenon of self-immolation can be, as
it has often been, misunderstood—ascribed, for example, to socioeconomic
factors.19 The Tibetan refugee crisis, similarly, cannot be appreciated
accurately apart from its colonial context. That crisis will persist, and
Tibetans in exile will remain stateless, until the world recognizes the
colonial status of their state and its belligerent occupation. In short, the
same context that has led thousands of Tibetans to seek greater freedom
outside their historic territory year after year has now led more than 120
Tibetans to set themselves on fire. The self-immolation crisis, which is
likely to persist, is therefore of a conceptual piece with the diaspora of
Tibetans in exile—and unlikely to end until Tibet’s people enjoy their
inalienable right to self-determination.
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II.
The Trusteeship Council, one of the six original organs established by
the UN Charter, suspended its work in 1994 after the tiny territory of
Palau became an associated state (with the United States).20 The Council
deemed decolonization, the postwar process that dismantled Europe’s
colonial empires, thereby quadrupling the number of states in the world in
less than half a century, complete. The Council still exists, but has
suspended its operations indefinitely, because it believes colonies do not.
In legal fact, Tibet, a colony the size of Western Europe, or roughly onequarter the size of the United States, exists to this day. It is inhabited by
about six million Tibetans but also, because of PRC tax breaks and similar
economic incentives offered to Han settlers, by a greater number of Han
who have migrated from China proper. Slowly but inexorably, these Han
settlers (now estimated to constitute about 7.5 million, roughly 1.5 million
more than the number of Tibetans) are overwhelming Tibet’s indigenous
population, as they did in Inner Mongolia decades ago, where Mongols
now make up less than 20% of the population. Because of Han migration,
Tibetans have likewise become a minority in Tibet, strangers in their own
land.
As a contemporary colony, Tibet manifests the same morally repugnant
characteristics as its predecessors and essentially the same dynamics that
characterized the prewar colonies of European empires in Africa, Latin
America, Asia, and elsewhere. These include brutal and discriminatory
treatment of the colonized by the colonizer, theft and exploitation of the
colony’s natural resources, and appropriation of its territory for the benefit
of the colonizer. As a de jure and de facto colony, Tibetans should enjoy
the rare legal entitlement to what the Canadian Supreme Court has referred
to as external self-determination, including a right to secede from the PRC
if they so choose in a free and fair referendum.21
In 1945 (notably before Tibet’s invasion), Article 2(4) of the UN
Charter, to which China is an original party, established the prohibition on
“the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state” as what many deem the foundational axiom of
the law governing relations between states in the postwar era. For one
thing, after the defeat of the Nazis, Europe could no longer avoid the
centrifugal sociopolitical dynamics breaking apart its erstwhile colonial
empires. States also recognized, finally, the injustice of both aggression
and colonization, predominant features of the world public order since the
conventional origin of the classical law of nations after the Peace of
Westphalia. And although the First World War’s Allies largely reconfigured
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rather than dismantled colonialism at the Versailles conference, the moral
bankruptcy of the practice became increasingly evident in the interwar
period. The old norm of political legitimacy, statehood, and sovereignty
based on the crude measure of effective control, which finds its classic
expression in the Tinoco arbitration,22 gave way to a theoretical
entitlement to statehood based on the (at first, largely idealistic) Wilsonian
principle of the self-determination of peoples.23
The self-determination of peoples, since its intellectual inception in the
Wilsonian era, has begged the question what makes one group, but not
another, a people for purposes of the principle. Scholars and politicians
alike have long recognized that not all self-identified peoples can, as a
practical matter, enjoy a legal entitlement to statehood or independence.
Consequently, as a rule, self-determination must be respected internally.24
I do not propose in this regard to break new ground or, indeed, analyze
this issue in any depth within the limits of this chapter. It suffices to
observe that Tibetans qualify as a people under any of the criteria
enunciated in the mainstream international legal discourse since as early as
the Aaland Islands precedent of the League of Nations25 and, more
recently, the influential decision of the Canadian Supreme Court in
Reference re Secession of Québec.26
In the first place, unlike most of the states established as a consequence
of decolonization after World War II, Tibetans share more than a common
history of colonization or simple residence within (often arbitrary) lines
that were later codified in conformity with the questionable post-colonial
norm of uti possidetis.27 As I have emphasized in past work, one persistent
problem afflicting the debate over Tibet’s historical status and its
relationship to China is that “the distinctly modern Western conception of
the nation-state, with precise borders and a single centralized government,
is probably inapposite to pre-twentieth century China and Tibet alike.”28
But that is true for well over two-thirds of the nearly 200 states in
existence as of 2013. Few, if any, of those states (and China is among
them) have had their legitimacy or right to exist as a state questioned on
that basis. Furthermore, Tibet, unlike a clear majority of the others, enjoys
a genuine national history stretching back millennia, that is, a history of
existence as a distinct polity (even before the Common Era) inhabited by a
distinct people sharing a host of characteristics and common governance.
From its origins in antiquity until the 1200s of the Common Era, it is,
to the best of my knowledge and research, undisputed among historians
that the nation of Tibet existed and enjoyed complete political
independence. Indeed, even “Chinese court historians recognized that by
the eighth century, Tibet had become the most powerful nation in Asia,”
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having “actually conquered several Chinese provinces.”29 In the ninth
century, China and Tibet famously concluded a treaty, which provides in
relevant part:
Both Tibet and China shall keep the country and frontiers of which they
are now in possession. The whole region to the east of that [demarcation]
being the country of Great Tibet, from either side of that frontier there
shall be no warfare, no hostile invasions, and no seizure of territory.30

China’s historical claim to “own” Tibet, ironically, relies not on historical
relations between China and Tibet inter se but on the political relationships
between Tibet and two foreign (non-Chinese) dynasties that ruled China
for centuries, namely, the Yuan (Mongol) (1271-1368) and the Qing
(Manchu) (1644-1911) dynasties. During these periods, Tibet enjoyed
more de facto political independence than China. Both the Mongols and
the Manchus ruled China directly. In contrast, Tibet continued at all times
to exercise most modern sovereign competences within the geopolitical
and spiritual framework of the unique cho-yun (priest-patron) relationship
that developed between Tibetan Buddhist leaders and first, the Mongol,
and later, the Manchu emperors who conquered and governed China. In
the interim, that is, during the reign of China’s native Ming dynasty (13681644), the nation of Tibet enjoyed a cultural and political renaissance
known as its “Second Kingdom.” At that time, it exercised even greater
political autonomy, largely free “of both Mongol and Chinese control.”31
China finally overthrew the Manchus, which had long been weakened
by European colonialism, among other forces, in 1911. Shortly thereafter,
Tibet expelled the two Manchu ambans (diplomatic representatives)—the
sole vestige of Manchu influence in Tibet—from Lhasa.32 Their role had
at any rate been largely symbolic for decades, if not centuries, not a
meaningful indicia of Qing sovereignty or control. On February 13, 1913,
the Thirteenth Dalai Lama, recognizing that modernity compelled urgent
changes (political, social, military, and economic) and appreciating, in
particular, the need for Tibet to emerge from its isolation and clarify its
national status, formally proclaimed Tibet’s independence as a sovereign
state on the model of the European nation-state. Without detracting from
its symbolic force, it bears emphasizing that this proclamation did not
create, but rather described or confirmed, Tibet’s status as an independent
polity under, inter alia, the formal criteria elaborated by the European law
of nations that had come to dominate the world in the twentieth century.
Historians, legal scholars, and international fact-finding studies have
uniformly concluded that even if Tibet’s pre-twentieth century status were
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genuinely debatable, it would nonetheless remain undisputed that between
the collapse of the Manchu Qing Dynasty in 1911 and the PLA’s invasion
of Tibet in 1950, Tibet enjoyed de jure and de facto independence, “the
conditions of statehood as generally accepted under international law,”33
that is, under the Montevideo or similar criteria.34
That leaves, as China’s sole claim to sovereignty over Tibet,
arguments based on its invasion and belligerent occupation of Tibet in and
since 1950. Contemporary international law, of course, invalidates the
annexation of territory by aggression, rendering it null and without legal
force or effect. In 1950, Tibet qualified as an independent state. The
PLA’s aggression did not change that status. But almost before the ink
dried on the UN Charter, China, despite having only recently expelled
European and Japanese colonial powers from its own territory, ironically
launched its own colonial adventure. In violation of Article 2(4) of the
Charter, which prohibits the acquisition of territory by force against the
“political independence of any state,” the PLA marched into Tibet after
winning the Chinese civil war. Tibet had relied for centuries on its difficult
terrain and unusual geographic isolation for protection against foreign
domination. But twentieth-century technology and geopolitical change
weakened, if not vitiated altogether, these defenses. And although Tibet
theoretically retained, under the nascent law of Article 51 of the UN
Charter, an “inherent right”35 to self-defense, with a small army of poorly
armed and technologically ill-equipped soldiers, it had no serious chance
of defending itself against the battle-hardened and technologically superior
(not to mention far more numerous) forces of the PLA.
Of course, China vehemently denies that Tibet has ever enjoyed
independence; in its view, Tibet has always been part of China. But this is
a manifest fiction. Every comprehensive scholarly study concludes to the
contrary.36 Regardless, that is, even assuming the point were genuinely
debatable rather than dogmatic (a product of longstanding, widespread,
and effective propaganda by the PRC, both within China and abroad), a
chief purpose of the UN Charter’s core norm in Article 2(4) is precisely to
insist that debates of this sort henceforth be resolved peacefully, that is, by
one of the pacific methods of dispute settlement set forth in Article 33,
paragraph 1, of the Charter. Otherwise Article 2(4) would have changed
little from the prewar baseline. After all, seldom, if ever, did states in the
centuries before the Charter’s conclusion not justify their territorial wars
and adventures, at least in part, by historical, cultural, religious, social, or
legal claims, generally asserting that the invaded polity, for one or another
such reasons, belonged to the invader. Saddam Hussein, for example,
unsurprisingly did the same when he invaded Kuwait in 1990.
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Together with Article 2(4), the principle of the self-determination of
peoples theoretically established the consent of peoples, as expressed, if
necessary, in free and fair referenda, as the postwar basis for sovereign
legitimacy. But as China recognizes, any concession to the idea of a
referendum on self-determination would lead to the immediate rejection of
Chinese rule by the Tibetan people. So to this day, while China insists that
the vast majority of Tibetans want to remain part of China, it refuses to
consider letting Tibetans vote in a plebiscite that would establish the truth
one way or the other. The reason is hardly recondite.
In retrospect, two historical contingencies facilitated Tibet’s rapid and,
in international relations, largely unnoticed absorption by China. First, it is
a sad irony that “the isolation Tibet’s government ha[d] self-consciously
cultivated to shield Tibet from foreign domination proved the principal
reason that Tibet found itself unable to achieve political recognition as a
modern nation-state—and thus powerless to resist foreign domination by
communist China.”37 Second, the Korean War broke out at the same time
as China’s invasion of Tibet. On June 25, 1950, North Korea crossed the
38th parallel, inaugurating the first of the hot wars that punctuated the
Cold War, which would dominate international relations and global
consciousness for the next forty years. Tibet is a casualty of that period. Its
people, as one author aptly put it, remain orphans of the Cold War.38
Tibet’s government sent a cable to the United Nations on October 25,
1950, pleading for international assistance to resist the PLA’s aggression.
Perhaps a few years later in postwar history, that cable would have led to
action, prompting some kind of collective self-defense or military
resistance. At a later time it may have prompted an international force
under UN auspices, a U.S.-led military intervention of the sort that
repulsed North Korea’s invasion of South Korea, or a unilateral resistance
by the United States such as its reaction to North Vietnam’s aggression
against South Vietnam years later.39 As the Fourteenth Dalai Lama
communicated to the nascent United Nations:
The attention of the world is riveted on Korea, where aggression is being
resisted by an international force. Similar happenings in remote Tibet are
passing without notice . . . . We can assure you, Mr. Secretary-General,
that Tibet will not go down without a fight, though there is little hope that
a nation dedicated to peace will be able to resist the brutal effort of men
trained to war, but we understand that the United Nations has decided to
stop aggression whenever it takes place. The armed invasion of Tibet for
the incorporation of Tibet in Communist China through sheer physical
force is a clear case of aggression . . . . The problem is simple. The Chinese
claim Tibet as a part of China. Tibetans feel that racially, culturally, and
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geographically they are far apart from the Chinese. If the Chinese find the
reactions of the Tibetans to their unnatural claim not acceptable, there are
other civilized methods by which they could ascertain the views of the
people of Tibet; or, should the issue be surely juridical, they are open to
seek redress in an international court of law . . . .40

More than half a century later, even young Tibetans who have never
known an independent state of Tibet, and can hardly speak of it without
fear, continue to feel—indeed, to know—as the cable puts it, “that racially,
culturally, and geographically they are far apart from the Chinese.” This is
so despite the best efforts of the PRC, which have involved intense
propaganda, economic incentives to Tibetans and ordinary Han, who have
been encouraged to resettle in Tibet, and chronic human rights violations
along with brutal repression of the remotest hint of Tibetan nationalism.
The unique characteristics of the Tibetan people constitute a second,
independent criterion on the basis of which Tibetans must be deemed a
people under contemporary international law. China has insisted for years
that Tibetans constitute one of its fifty-five “minority nationalities,” of
which the Han allegedly constitute one, despite accounting for more than
90% of China’s 1.3 billion residents. To those familiar with Chinese and
Tibetan history, culture, sociology, or politics, the idea that Tibetans are a
Chinese minority is preposterous. It will suffice to canvass a few of the
most glaring distinctions between the Tibetan and Chinese peoples.
First, Tibetans speak their own language, which dates back millennia.
It is not a dialect of Mandarin or Cantonese. It does not even bear an
etymological relationship to the Chinese language group—unlike, for
example, Japanese, which uses Chinese characters. Tibetan has its own
alphabet and grammatical structure. In terms of etymology, linguists
characterize it as part of the Tibeto-Burmese language group. The Tibetan
language also does not contain a word for China that includes Tibet: In
Tibetan, Bod refers to Tibet, while Gyanag means China. Only in the postoccupation period have Tibetans come to use the term Zhonngguo for the
PRC (that is, for China including Tibet).
Second, the vast majority of Tibetans adhere to an intricate, unique,
and highly distinctive religious tradition. The form of Buddhism that
evolved over centuries in Tibet differs doctrinally and culturally from both
Indian variants and the predominant Chinese sect, that is, Chán (Zen in
Japanese). At any rate, only a minority of Han practice Buddhism, a
tradition that entered China from India in the fifth century of the Common
Era. Confucian, Taoist, and other spiritual or cultural traditions have for
most of Chinese history been much more widespread and dominant within
Chinese civilization than Buddhism. They remain so today. Tibetan
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Buddhism, in contrast, originated in the unique fusion of Indian Mahayana
Buddhism and the indigenous Tibetan religion or spiritual tradition of
Bonpo, which, like the Tibetan language, dates back millennia, culminating
in the Vajrayana tradition that came to prevail in Tibet and Mongolia.
Third, Tibetans differ racially from Han. “Han Chinese” is a tautology;
there are no non-Han Chinese in a racial, cultural, or ethnic sense. The
characterization of some Chinese citizens as “Han Chinese” originated in
the postwar era. It is part of the fiction created and perpetuated by the PRC
to justify Chinese colonization of areas, including Tibet and East
Turkestan, which China calls Xinjiang. China characterizes these regions
as part of a greater China, the “Motherland,” not coincidentally, a project
similar to (but more successful than) the effort of Slobodan Milosević and
his allies to establish a “greater Serbia.” China’s policies towards Tibet
reflect colonial motives, such as natural resource exploitation and the need
for territory to accommodate China’s huge Han population—as well as, I
think, misplaced national pride. For Tibet is no more part of a Chinese
“Motherland” than France could rightfully be said to be part of a
hypothetically reconstituted Roman Empire. Even today, not only do most
Tibetans not regard themselves as Chinese, most Han do not regard
Tibetans as Chinese. China’s elite has long considered China the literal
and figurative center of civilization, the “Middle Kingdom.” Tibetans
historically had been one of the foreign peoples that China characterized
as barbarians beyond its civilization’s borders. The idea that Tibet is part
of a Chinese “Motherland” is a twentieth-century invention.
Turning from history, culture, and sociology to law, yet another reason
that has been proffered for Tibet’s supposed status as part of China is
treaty relations. Preliminarily, it is worth noting that Tibet’s entry into
numerous treaties with states including Nepal, India, Mongolia, the United
Kingdom, and China in the first half of the twentieth century casts serious
doubt on the assertion that China has always controlled Tibet’s foreign
affairs.41 But the gravamen of this aspect of China’s claim today is that
regardless of Tibet’s status historically, it became an inalienable part of
China after the 17-Point Agreement of 1951.42 That treaty states in
strikingly irredentist language that “the Tibetan people shall return to the
big family of the motherland—the People’s Republic of China.”43
Because, with few exceptions, only states can be parties to treaties,44 the
very fact that China felt the need to ground its future relationship with the
Tibetan people and their government on such a legal basis ironically
implies, contrary to China’s position, that Tibet had indeed been a state
before the 17-Point Agreement. Why, after all, had Tibet left “the big
family of the motherland”? Why did it need to “return”? Surely the answer
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cannot be, as China suggests, European colonialism. Only a literal handful
of foreigners resided in Tibet before the Chinese invasion, and unlike
China, no European state ever colonized Tibet. China nonetheless ascribes
any Tibetan desire for independence or autonomy to foreign instigation,
typically meaning Western states that allegedly want to “split” China.
Again, the true wishes of Tibet’s people could be readily ascertained by a
plebiscite. China unsurprisingly refuses to consider this simple expedient.
An irredeemable defect at any rate invalidates the 17-Point Agreement:
the PRC imposed it on Tibet by violence, including coercion of both Tibet
(by the threat of an invasion of Lhasa and other areas) and its government’s
personal representatives (by the threat of violence against them if they
refused to sign). Shortly after Tibet’s belligerent occupation in 1950, the
Dalai Lama, facing few real choices, sent official Tibetan delegates to
Beijing to “negotiate.” But “under duress that included both [threats of]
personal violence and large-scale military retaliation against Tibet, [and]
acting without the authority or approval of the Tibet government, [they]
signed the so-called 17-Point Agreement.”45 The treaty is therefore “null
and void ab initio”46 under the law of treaties. Even if it were valid
initially, the PRC abrogated the 17-Point Agreement almost immediately
after its signature and continuing to date. China materially breached the
treaty by, among other violations, coercively modifying Tibet’s existing
local government and imposing severe restrictions on the Tibetan people’s
freedom to practice their religion.47
Yet another reason that the Tibetan people qualify legally as a people
and merit self-determination is China’s history of persistent human rights
violations in Tibet. These violations include not only violence against the
person and restrictions on freedom of conscience and expression, but also
complete refusal to allow Tibetans to exercise any form of internal selfdetermination—including, even though China deems Tibetans a minority,
the de minimis minority nationality rights enumerated in Article 27 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”). China
denies to the Tibetan people the rights, among others, to freedoms of
religion, speech, education, political participation, and economic or
cultural autonomy. Nomads have recently been forcibly resettled and
traditional, often historic, structures and homes in Lhasa demolished to
make room for new Chinese construction. Serious civil and political rights
violations include systematic torture, summary execution, and arbitrary
detention, practices that have long been part of China’s response to any
manifestation of Tibetan nationalism or dissent from Chinese rule.48
China’s human rights violations continue to have grave consequences for
the Tibetan people, most recently illustrated by its brutal crackdown on
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widespread political demonstrations in 2008, and even more recently, by
its callous response to the tragic wave of self-immolations in Tibet.
For these reasons, as the Canadian Supreme Court suggested, Tibet’s
people may well have an additional claim to external self-determination
based on China’s persistent refusal to let them exercise internal selfdetermination (sufficient autonomy, political, cultural, and otherwise,
within the larger nation-state), in combination with the PRC’s severe and
persistent human rights abuses49—a criterion intimated as early as the
Aaland Islands precedent of the post-World War I era.50 The PRC has
shown consistently that it will not allow Tibetans even the minimal rights
afforded to “ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities” (let alone those
afforded to peoples) by international law, including the minority rights
guaranteed by Article 27 of the ICCPR, “the right, in community with the
other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and
practise their own religion, or to use their own language.”51
In sum, Tibetans qualify as a people who should be entitled under
international law to external self-determination under any definition of the
latter term that does not reduce this central legal concept of the postwar
era to a largely empty slogan. Yet for decades, the Fourteenth Dalai Lama,
(until recently) Tibet’s political and spiritual leader, has not insisted on
self-determination. He has not asked for the referendum on Tibet’s status
to which his people remain legally entitled. His priority has been to secure
meaningful cultural autonomy, an arrangement that would sacrifice
political self-determination for the sake of preserving the Tibetan people’s
rich cultural, religious, ethnic, linguistic, and other heritage.52 Because this
modest request, too, has been met with obstinate refusal and a steady and
inexorable process of Sinicization, it should not be surprising that Tibet’s
people today see few options except self-imposed exile, which perpetuates
a crisis of statelessness, and more recently, self-immolation, a new
response to what has rightly been described, colloquially even if not
legally, as the cultural genocide of the Tibetan people.

III.
Predictably, China’s position on the self-immolations, consistent with
its approach to any manifestation of dissent in Tibet, is to blame the Dalai
Lama. This position is both implausible and ironic in the face of, among
other developments, the Dalai Lama’s relinquishment of any claim to
political authority and, for well over two decades before, his public and
repeated affirmation that he seeks only greater cultural and religious
autonomy for Tibetans. China’s position on the self-immolations is as
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preposterous as it is tragic: that a nearly 80-year-old monk has managed to
penetrate one of the most strictly controlled political societies in existence
today in order to orchestrate a geographically widespread campaign of
self-immolations from abroad in cooperation with Tibetan refugees and
their foreign supporters. A representative article in the China Daily quotes
Wang Chengxian, the deputy Communist Party Secretary of the Aba
Tibetan and Qiang autonomous prefectures: “For the exiled 14th Dalai
Lama and his [associates] in India, instigating self-immolation is just a
means of realizing their political goal of splitting Tibet from China.”53
Similarly, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei said that “the
Dalai Lama and his associates have been instigating Tibetan independence
and creating ‘disturbances’ and that [he] and his associates ‘singlehandedly’ planned” one of the self-immolations.54 China has also
characterized Tibetans who self-immolate as terrorists and enacted a new
“public security offense” that subjects those who attempt it to criminal
prosecution.55
The PRC’s rhetoric, however divorced from reality and colored by its
colonial agenda, betrays the true cause of the self-immolation crisis.
Despite more than half a century of PRC effort—ranging from financial
and social incentives, to censorship, to abduction of a six-year-old boy,56
to “patriotic reeducation” sessions mandated for Tibet’s monasteries and
nunneries, to chronic human rights violations against the person, including
torture, arbitrary detention, extrajudicial executions, and other forms of
political violence—the PRC cannot convince some six million Tibetans
that they are a minority nationality of the Chinese people. Tibetans know
that they are not Chinese. They know that Tibet is not part of China.57
They maintain a cultural, historical, religious, ethnic, linguistic, and
perhaps above all, national identity that differs from that of the 1.2 billion
plus Han who populate China proper.
Tibet is a sovereign state under illegal foreign occupation. It is the
world’s largest colony.58 Only brute military force and the political and
economic power of modern China today, combined with an intense
propaganda campaign within China and abroad, obscure Tibet’s
colonization. Until that status changes, until China allows the Tibetan
people to exercise their right as a people to self-determination, no effort
“to control Tibetan discontent by means of carrot and stick” will be
availing.59 Hence the self-immolation crisis within Tibet casts considerable
light on the unresolved refugee crisis without—where some 150,000
Tibetans reside in exile, largely as stateless persons.60 Neither selfimmolations nor the Tibetan diaspora will cease until Tibet’s people
receive the same right that every other formerly colonized people should
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receive in the postwar era: self-determination. As the world’s largest
remaining colony, Tibet’s right to external self-determination, including, if
its people so choose, independence as a sovereign state, should be legally
undisputed.61
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